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Introduction
Formal exchanges between donor and recipient about
the domestic policy framework influencing the
outcome of an aid transfer, are termed 'policy
dialogue'. Donors' fondness for it has grown
alongside (a) their perceptions of generalised
economic malaise in many LDCs, and (b) recipients'
demand for balance-of-payments support rather than
project aid. A few observers have even claimed that the
unique function of aid is to induce policy reforms
engendering efficient resource allocation and economic
growth, rather than to relieve scarcities of domestic
savings or foreign exchange;' such a view greatly
enhances the importance of policy dialogue.
Accordingly, this review emphasises macroeconomic,
resource allocation and institutional questions, rather
than the project-specific exchanges that typify aid
relationships. Both balance-of-payments support and
sector aid are now increasingly popular vehicles for
wider policy dialogue; this article covers both.
Past donor reticence about seeking negotiations with
recipient governments over matters not directly
concerned with a particular project has receded.
Recipients have acquiesced in procedures that might
once have been considered infringements of national
sovereignty. Now that it has become a prominent facet
of international economic relations, what does (and
what could) explicit policy dialogue add to aid-
effectiveness? And what are the necessary conditions
for the success of policy dialogue?
Some Definitions and Distinctions
Donors tend to argue that 'dialogue' is not
'conditionality' or 'leverage'. USAID's discussion of
'A view succinctly expressed by Krueger (1981): the core of her
argument is not that aid flows in themselves assist capital
accumulation or efficiency in resource allocation but that 'economic
growth is largely the outcome of domestic policies and incentive
structures which encourage the accumulation of additional
resources and their efficient utilisation [Krueger 1981:280].
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policy dialogue [USAID 1982] points out that the use
of aid to foster policy improvements presupposes
some initial disagreement on the direction, scope,
degree or timing of policy change.
'Leverage' refers to the capacity to enforce one
viewpoint over another, while 'dialogue' implies that
either viewpoint, or both, can change to bridge the
initial difference. By means of 'dialogue' the recipient
comes to view policy changes as advancing its own
economic progress; with 'leverage' the recipient agrees
to enact certain policies in response to incentives by
the donor. Leverage, in this sense, is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the success of
policy dialogue.
The World Bank operates a similar distinction
between 'policy dialogue' and 'policy conditionality'.
The latter results from the view that, in success or
failure at structural adjustment, vested interests count
as much as the rationality of policy-making; the donor
agency must therefore find a way to exert leverage.
It is doubtful whether such a sharp distinction between
'dialogue' and 'conditionality' can be sustained. There
is, of course, a distinction of form between aid flows
governed by agreements incorporating explicit policy
conditions which a recipient must meet before funds
are released, and those which are not. Explicit
conditionality, however, is not the only route to
leverage. Even in the most formal use of conditionality
to exert leverage, the programmes of the ¡MF, the
importance attached to a particular policy change in
negotiations need not be reflected in the explicit
conditions eventually incorporated in an agreement.2
A more workable set of distinctions concerns the
arena of dialogue: short-run economic policy,
development strategy as a whole, or sector policies?
2Therefore, one cannot gauge the relative importance of different
policy instruments in ¡MF or World Bank adjustment programmes
by establishing the frequency of their appearance in formal
agreements.
The IMF traditionally confined the scope of its policy
conditionality to those items it deemed necessary to
ensure the repayment of its short-term loans, and
those items falling within its mandate to supervise
exchange regimes. Fund conditionality became
identified largely with instruments of short-run
demand management, and the Fund explicitly
disclaimed any role in the determination of income
distribution or the formulation of long-run develop-
ment strategy. Macroconditionality of the kind
incorporated in World Bank Structural Adjustment
Loans (SALs) represents an extension of explicit
leverage to cover a much wider range of instruments.
In parallel, the focus of donors upon the conditions of
operation of individual projects has broadened into a
concern with the institutional framework and
individual policies which govern the sectors in which
projects and programmes are to take effect. The
examples briefly outlined here will indicate that
dialogue or leverage which can succeed at one level in
one country or period will not necessarily be
sustainable or appropriate elsewhere.
Is there a Universal Prescription?
Dialogue presupposes disagreement on the part of the
donor with the recipient's policies, and hence some
source for the alternative view. The USAID paper
cautions that 'it is, of course, salutary to keep in mind
that the market for truth is a competitive one - where
no monopoly survives for long - and that arrogance
should be avoided' [USAID 1982]. Nevertheless,
concern that some excessively uniform policy
prescription will be imposed on different countries, as
a result of decisions taken by governing bodies
knowing little of the individual circumstances,
remains at the heart of doubts about conditionality
and policy dialogue.
Until recently, the IMF was virtually the only
international agency subject to that criticism. The
Fund has been identified with the 'three Ds'
(devaluation, deflation, decontrol), and with a short-
term, demand-reducing aproach to balance-of-
payments adjustment. Whatever the merits of that
criticism (see below), the Fund can claim that its
articles require it to emphasise short-term stabilisation,
to protect the revolving nature of its resources by
ensuring rapid repayment, and to stress liberalisation
in its approach to trade and payments practices. For
other donors, such a justification for uniformity of
prescription is not available.
The rise of policy dialogue, and ofthe participation of
agencies other than the ¡MF in balance-of-payments
aid to support structural adjustment programmes, has
exposed multilateral (and to some extent bilateral)
donors to similar criticisms. In part this is a
consequence of a natural learning process: while
policy dialogue and conditionality remain novel,
donor agency personnel are bound to rely on
prescriptions from experience internationally, rather
than from the policy problems of the country
concerned.3 But there are also genuinely distinct
views: that the general thrust of 'good policy' for
development is now well understood [eg Krueger
1981]; or that it is not [cg Bird 1981].
Those in the first camp assert that we now have
sufficient experience of the development process to
identify the kind of policy changes that are likely to
pay off; in particular, donors should encourage a shift
from a policy stance of 'control' over the domestic
economy to one favouring a liberal trade regime and
an outward-looking framework of incentives. Pro-
ponents of this view assert widespread agreement
about the benefits of iniform incentives (as between
production for the home market and for export) in
domestic markets and trade regimes.
The opposition points to the examples of multiple and
conflicting definitions of 'good development per-
formance' found over the years in the literature and in
the pronouncements of aid agencies. They stress that
many of the countries now praised for trade
liberalisation initially built up their industrial sectors
with the help of substantial protection and state
intervention. Above all, they argue that the 'incentives
school' has overestimated the benefits for equity,
efficiency or growth of 'getting prices right' in the
absence of complementary changes, cg foreign aid
flows; institutional change; and restructuring of
investment towards, or assets within, agriculture; or
research into suitable production techniques (stressing,
for example, the inevitably low total price-elasticities
of supply in the technologically stagnant agricultures
of much of sub-Saharan Africa [Bond 1983; Lipton
1985].
In the past three or four years this debate has to some
extent been superseded. A good example of the
evolution of donor attitudes is afforded by the second
[World Bank 1983] and third [World Bank 1984]
reports on sub-Saharan Africa by the World Bank.
Although no-one, and least of all the Bank, would
advocate 'getting the prices wrong',there is now much
greater emphasis on the length of time needed to
achieve structural adjustment and on the organised
support for price changes and liberalisation that must
Even in the World Bank, which has traditionally conducted the
most comprehensive reviews of overall country performance and
policy, country economic work was previously carried out in
support of allocation decisions about project aid rather than for
macroeconomic policy prescription. The advent of SALs has,
according to Bank officials, significantly enhanced the Importance
of country and sector policy work in its own right (and of those
responsible for it).
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come from institutional reform, agricultural research,
and continued investment in social services. There is
evidence (see below) that these shifts of emphasis arise
from the accumulation of experience with conditional
lending and the design of policy reform programmes.
The World Bank is itself now conducting major
research projects to examine the design of structural
adjustment programmes, covering issues such as the
'timing and sequencing' of trade liberalisation.
Any universal prescription tends to dissolve when
exposed to a specific context. Donors seeking policy
dialogue face quite different tasks, for example, in
countries with massive institutional deficiencies
(budgets not made or followed, public sector salaries
unpaid, or widespread corruption) from those they
face in countries where administrative infrastructure
survives but prices are manifestly wrong. The tasks
alter again in most LDCs which exhibit neither
extreme.
While there can be few objections to a judicious
transfer of the lessons of international experience,
reform programmes are likely to perform better when
they have evolved from a process that recognisably
incorporates local experience, objectives and con-
straints. Donor agencies routinely deny that there is
uniformity in policy prescription from country to
country; as agencies develop greater institutional
experience with dialogue in differing circumstances it
should prove easier to demonstrate substance in this
denial.
The International Monetary Fund4
The IMF is not an aid-giving institution, but provides
the yardstick for the stance of other donors in
dialogue. Moreover, a Fund programme is a
prerequisite for debt-rescheduling and World Bank
SALs. Nearly 60 developing countries were engaged in
stabilisation programmes supported by the Fund's
conditional resources during 1982-84. The links
between the IMF and donor agencies are therefore
vital to the stance which donors adopt in dialogue.
Recently, breakdowns in relations with the IMF have
tended also to mean failures to attract additional
inflows of aid.
The arguments about Fund programmes are of long
standing. Does the Fund impose excessive contraction
on deficit countries, neglecting the need for
counterpart action by surplus countries? Does it take
adequate account of social and political realities?
Does it ignore equity concerns? Does it, unknowingly,
sacrifice long-term development prospects to short-
'This section draws upon the chapter on 'The Policy Dialogue: the
IMF' by Robert Cassen. included in the unpublished literature
survey for the Aid-Effectiveness Study.
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run stabilisation? Does it distinguish adequately
between internal and external causes of disequilibrium?
And does it evaluate the differing capacities of its
client countries to withstand external shocks?
The IMF has a straightforward reply to its critics.
When a country has a balance-of-payments deficit
which is not self-correcting, it must take steps to
achieve adjustment within available resources. The
Fund assesses what resources are available; it then
looks at the means by which a government might close
the residual deficit through domestic action. It is the
government's responsibility, not the Fund's, to
calculate the political or social consequences of its
actions.
Accepting that some degree of retrenchment has
become inevitable in virtually all deficit countries, the
problem is the availability of resources to the Fund.
The Fund has been obliged to restrict access to upper
credit tranche facilities, encouraging the view that
conditionality has toughened. The Oil Facility, Trust
Fund and Subsidy Accounts used to provide
concessional support in the 1970s have not been
replenished; the Fund has tackled the problems of the
post-1979 recession without them. The Compensatory
Financing Facility has been able to respond only to a
fraction of the valid claims upon it. Despite quota
enlargement, the overall volume of the Fund's
resources has not kept pace with demand, and the
multiple of quota that may be borrowed by countries
with severe debt service problems now seems in
practice to be falling. In order to safeguard the
integrity of its revolving resources, the Fund is now in
the position of forcing many low-income countries to
sustain net exports of capital to repay its own and
other loans for five or even 10 years. It is difficult to
view this resource-constrained stance as anything but
damaging to the development of poor countries and
the stability of international trade and payments
arrangements.5 As the focus of Fund activities (and
controversy about its impact) shifts from the larger,
middle-income economies of Latin America towards
the chronically dislocated low-income economies of
sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of the resource
constraint, as accentuated by the absence of any
substantial medium- or long-term facility for con-
cessional balance-of-payments support, becomes still
more obvious and damaging. Such a facility may not
properly belong with the Fund [Dell 1984], but its
absence exacerbates the harshness of the Fund
programmes.
Indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa 'repurchases' due by debtors to the
Fund are sustainable only on the assumption that other creditors
are prepared to engage in repeated reschedulings. For an overall
assessment of African debt and its structure, see Griffith-Jones and
Green (1984).
Substantial and rapid retrenchment inevitably reduces
the effectiveness of traditional project aid. When
governments cannot meet local and recurrent costs,
foreign exchange for capital works is of limited use.
Public expenditure reductions in a context of already
weak administration tend to make delivery of services
still less reliable - at least in the short run.
This is not to argue that 'Fund-type' stabilisation and
adjustment programmes are wrong or unnecessary.
But their usefulness, and that of aid flows, is strongly
influenced by the availability of resources to the Fund.
Moreover, the potential for recovery in many of the
Fund's low-income borrowers, will depend on the
availability of aid from other donors to support a
process of adjustment in the production structure.
Each country's situation is different in respect not only
of the causes of its difficulties; but also of its capacity
to respond and adapt, given the will to implement
stringent adjustment programmes. Some of the
middle-income countries have adjusted well to the
external shocks of the 1980s. They have shifted
resources towards tradeables production, curbed
excessive domestic expenditures, and - albeit at high
cost in austerity - re-positioned themselves for
expected future conditions. It is precisely this capacity
to adjust that is lacking in the poorest countries.
The World Bank and Structural Adjustment
Lending6
The World Bank's experience and mandate made it
ideally placed to establish a facility providing balance-
of-payments lending in support of long-term adjust-
ment programmes for low-income countries. Structural
Adjustment Loans (SALs), however, have developed
not as an alternative to Fund programmes, but as a
complement to them. They are still relatively modest
operations, since there has been a limit of 10 per cent
of annual commitments upon the Bank's non-project
lending. Until recently, there was a concentration of
SALs upon middle-income countries (and semi-
industrial ones): Turkey, South Korea, Thailand,
Philippines, Panama, for example. Even within
Africa, middle-income and 'near-middle-income'
countries figure prominently in the list of SAL
recipients: Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritius, Togo,
Senegal. Conspicuously absent are low-income South
Asia (one SAL operation in Pakistan was suspended
when the country's balance-of-payments improved),
the Sahelian countries, or those populous countries in
Africa suffering severe political and economic
dislocation (cg Zaire, Sudan, Ethiopia).
6This section is based upon the chapter 'Structural Adjustment
Lending by Philip Daniel in the literature survey for the Aid-
Effectiveness Study, and upon the accounts of SALs in the Kenya
and Malawi country case studies.
Not all World Bank non-project lending is channelled
through SALs. Nor is policy dialogue dependent upon
non-project lending. In Ghana and Zambia, for
example, much the same intensity of policy dialogue
has been achieved through World Bank programme or
project support for rehabilitation projects in key
export sectors, whose operation is sufficiently affected
by macroeconomic policy and overall public invest-
ment allocation decisions to make economy-wide
dialogue and conditionality a feature of what is
ostensibly sector support.
A senior official of the Bank [Stern 1983] has stated
that SALs are designed to:
- support a programme of specific policy changes
and institutional reforms designed to reduce the
current account deficit to sustainable levels;
- assist a country in meeting the transitional costs of
structural changes in industry and agriculture by
augmenting the supply of freely usable foreign
exchange;
- act as a catalyst for the inflow of other external
capital to help ease the balance-of-payments
situation.
SALs7 sprang from the realisation that, in the post-
1979 international economic environment, LDCs
were likely to require extensive programmes of
domestic policy reform in order to respond to changed
international relative prices, terms of trade
deterioration, and declining net inflows of foreign
finance. The postponement of such reform had, it was
claimed, created in many countries a syndrome of
severe price distortions, administrative over-regulation,
public-sector inefficiency, falling savings and low-
yielding capital investment. The Bank recognised the
political difficulty of remedial action and the
likelihood of perverse short-term economic effects
from the measures required for long-term structural
change. Hence the need to provide additional
resources to enable a government to implement the
necessary programme of reform.
In principle, the distinction between Bank SALs and
IMF programmes is one of time horizon and range of
instruments. Whereas the Fund is primarily concerned
with financing and correcting balance-of-payments
deficits in the short-run, the Bank's SALs are intended
to encourage a sustainable long-run balance-of-
payments position that is compatible with growth.
The Bank concerns itself, much more than the Fund,
with resource mobilisation and allocation policies
directed at increasing the supply of tradeable goods. In
71n what follows, we discuss World Bank policy dialogue in terms of
SALs. but the points also refer to other forms of Bank conditional
non-project lending.
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practice, the distinction is less clear - especially where
the Fund becomes involved in a series of programmes,
or in an EFF.
The two institutions normally complement each other
well. Differences of function, however, have led to
differences between the Bank and the Fund,
particularly in East Africa. Differences arise over the
degree of retrenchment judged necessary: partly a
matter of technical judgement, and partly of political
or institutional feasibility.
The key question is the comprehensiveness and timing
of appropriate measures. The Bank's appraisals of
SAL operations so far suggest that much learning has
taken place about the pre-requisites for successful
policy reform: comprehensiveness appears to be
yielding to selectivity, and 'short, sharp shock' to a
more sensitive approach to the sequencing of critical
measures such as trade liberalisation, the removal of
subsidies, or introduction of user charges for public
services. The Fund's resource constraints, and the
nature of its facilities, make it less able to follow such
an evolution. The continuing tensions thus need to be
adddressed urgently, if the normally effective
cooperation between the Bank and the Fund is to be
maintained.
At 1 July 1985,31 SALs had been approved covering
17 countries and amounting to $4.5 bn. Four
programmes had been discontinued (Bolivia, Senegal,
Guyana and Pakistan8), but one country (Turkey) had
received four consecutive loans while eight countries
had received two loans each.
The appraisal of SALs involves four elements: the
appropriateness of the policy reform package; the
sequencing of programmes; the process of dialogue,
including the capacity to sustain it within the recipient
LDC; and, lastly, the accuracy of the estimates of
terms of trade movements and foreign financial
inflows, upon which the macroeconomic prescriptions
of the programme depend.
The limited evidence so far does not convict the Bank
of imposing uniform policies through SALs. On the
other hand, there has been vigorous attention to
regularly recurring areas of desirable policy reform.
The Bank's task is to continue to act as a catalyst for
difficult domestic decisions, while not so elevating
disagreements that they are perceived as a political or
Pakistan's SAL became unnecessary when the country's balance of
payments improved; Bolivia's collapsed as a result of political
upheavals; Guyana's fell victim to the severe economic dislocation
in that country; only for Senegal can we conclude that a different
approach to policy dialogue, and greater flexibility, might have
allowed the programme to be sustained - the lessons of this case
seem now to be well-understood. Consequently, the Bank can fairly
claim a satisfactory 'success rate' for SALs.
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ideological challenge by the government concerned.9
The components of SAL reform programmes tend to
comprise, not necessarily in order of priority, (1)
restructuring of incentives (pricing, tariffs, taxation,
subsidies, interest rates); (2) revision of public
investment priorities; (3) better budget and debt
management; (4) strengthening institutions, especially
public enterprises. There is widespread awareness of
the complementarity between these broad groups,
particularly between measures to alter price incentives
and the institutional reforms which might give real
effect to incentive changes.
Now that sub-Saharan Africa has become a major
focus of the structural adjustment effort, the
recipient's capacity to sustain dialogue and policy
reform is central to the success of SALs. With few
exceptions (of which South Korea is the prime
example) it seems that the initiative in SAL
programme formulation tends to lie with the World
Bank rather than with the recipient government.
While neither surprising nor reprehensible, this does
point to the need to strengthen recipient capacities for
negotiation and policy analysis. Otherwise, the risks
remain that the programme will be regarded as an
outside imposition, will fail to take root or produce
lasting change, and will contain inappropriate
diagnosis.
The priority attached by the Bank to lending for
reconstruction and recovery in sub-Saharan Africa
carries a special risk that particular problems will be
viewed as 'solved' once a programme has been drawn
up that can win Bank staff and board approval.
Agreement on a structural adjustment programme is
only the beginning of a long and fragile process.
Poor estimation of trends in externally-determined
influences on a country's balance-of-payments has
been a prominent cause of difficulty in SAL
programmes. Export prices and capital flows, for
example, are vital determinants of a country's ability
to sustain trade liberalisation (vide Kenya's first SAL).
From 1979 to 1983, World Bank commodity price
forecasts were persistently over-optimistic; the fore-
cas'ts affected the design of programmes, and the
collapse of justified expectations exacerbated pro-
gramme failures (notably those in Guyana'°). The
possibility of forecasting errors does not detract from
the value of SALs, but it makes a case for greater
This problem has clouded the relations of the international financial
institutions with countries as diverse as Jamaica, Nigeria, Tanzania
and India; the recurrent disputes of the IMF with Argentina, Brazil
and Peru are better known.
'°The suspended SAL in Guyana fell victim to domestic
mismanagement, but the domestic strains themselves were
intensified by larger-than-expected deteriorations in the unit value
of sugar and bauxite exports.
flexibility in policy reform programmes and in the
volume of funds the Bank is permitted to devote to
SALs. When an unexpected terms-of-trade
deterioration makes a government unable to meet
individual conditions of a programme there should be
some alternative to complete abandonment or
renegotiation of the whole programme; without the
necessary flexibility, Bank (and IMF) adjustment
programmes could become self-defeating.
The World Bank's conditional non-project lending
has shown potential to evolve in fruitful directions.
Balance-of-payments support is clearly needed in a
large number of low-income countries, and the new
Bank schemes offer one of the most effective methods
of providing it. They also offer a focus for support
from other donors in a framework within which
recipients appear increasingly able to implement
major measures of reform. Far from curtailing SALs
and related Bank operations such as sector aid, there is
still an urgent need to expand them - learning from
recent experience, bolstering them with concessional
support, and improving the consistency with them of
Fund operations. As a means of delivering aid, non-
project forms linked with policy dialogue deserve
support, even if there are justifiable criticisms of
reform programmes undertaken in particular contexts.
Other Donors and Policy Dialogue
Policy dialogue and leverage involving bilateral
donors has rarely been conducted within explicit
frameworks comparable to Fund programmes or
Bank SALs. Such dialogue is inevitably an extension
of bilateral political and economic relations in non-aid
fields; it thus raises more sensitivities, and may involve
more influences extraneous to development policy
than the dialogue of multilateral agencies» Some
bilateral agencies are more enthusiastic than others
about interventions in recipients' domestic policy
discussions. In Bangladesh, for example, USAID
maintains a large mission and engages in continuing
bilateral policy dialogue with the government; the
Japanese agencies, on the other hand, maintain no
such representation and claim never to exert influence
in bilateral discussions with the government; other
donors occupy positions on the spectrum between)2
There have been a few instances of direct use of
leverage by a major bilateral donor to bring about
'The EEC is commonly considered a multilateral agency; for
purposes of this discussion, however, the increasingly coordinated
foreign policy stance of EEC member states, and the relation of atd
and trade under the Lomé Convention, make its role in policy
dialogue more bilateral'.
2 USAID maintains a high profile, but it is not the only agency with
an independent approach. The Scandinavian donors, the Dutch and
the Canadians all maintain independent channels of dialogue -
often because of their special interest in the distributional effects of
aid.
macroeconomic policy change by a recipient govern-
ment. The case of US pressure in India in the mid-
l960s is outlined below, and casts doubt on the
usefulness of the approach. The management of a
long-term bilateral relationship where, for historical
reasons, the recipient's reliance upon the donor's
support is substantial, is a matter of great delicacy; by
its nature, not much will be known about the record by
non-participants.
The new task for bilateral donors has been to assess
the implications of the rapid spread of Bank- or Fund-
organised adjustment programmes, and the counter-
part need for increased flows of non-project aid. With
some exceptions, bilateral agencies have traditionally
been organised and staffed to cope with project aid,
not with programmes of economy-wide policy reform.
The World Bank has invited bilateral donors to
support SAL programmes,t3 which, therefore, they
must be able to appraise. But will policy dialogue and
negotiation of policy conditionality by agencies other
than the Bank and the Fund be confusing or
counter-productive?
Avoidance of fragmentation and mis-diagnosis in the
dialogue process requires, first, strengthening of the
recipient's negotiating capacities, and role in donor
coordination. Secondly, the obstacles to donor
coordination are well-known (trade interests, political
competition, agency self-preservation and so on);
nevertheless, there could be better use of consultative
groups for 'dialogue among donors', and for
resolution (involving the recipient) of policy reform
packages that will command wide donor support.
Which, then, is to be the lead institution in the process
- the Bank, the Fund, a multi-donor secretariat? The
best approach will probably involve the gradual
evolution of more formal procedures for consulting
key bilateral donors in consultative groups, and
during the process of framing Bank or Fund-
supported adjustment programmes. The key
objective, however, must be to raise the capacities and
importance of the recipient in the dialogue.
Recipient Experience of Dialogue:
the Indian Case14
India enjoyed good relationships with aid donors up
to the mid-1960s. Donors accepted India's formal
planning framework and selected from among the
projects it yielded; they made few noticeable attempts
at intervention in the conduct of economic policy.
When war, drought and agricultural problems placed
° Notably in its reports on sub-Saharan Africa. The EEC (European
Development Fund) and the OPEC Fund both contributed in
support of Kenya's first SAL reform programme.
'This section is based on the chapter on policy dialogue by Michael
Lipton in the case-study of India for the Aid-Effectiveness Study.
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India's balance-of-payments under pressure from
about 1965 onwards, donor attitudes quickly changed.
Since then the Indian story of policy dialogue consists
of three transitions: from explicit use of leverage to
more relaxed dialogue; from heavy involvement of a
single donor (the US) to the conduct of dialogue with a
Bank-led donor consortium; and from macro-
conditionality to a sectoral framework for dialogue.
The devaluation forced on India in 1966 was much
needed, but ill-timed. It was forced as a condition of
the resumption of US aid, against the wishes of the
Indian Finance Minister, and it was the subject of
major pressures and tensions between the donors and
the Government of India. The Consortium's aid
package, designed to support both devaluation and
further trade liberalisation measures, collapsed when
the US pulled out. Such a degree of bilateral leverage
over macro-economic policy was achieved only in
conditions of acute economic difficulty for India, and
at a cost of chronic disruption to both aid
relationships and Indian economic management. In
the medium term the Indian response was to seek to
diversify her sources of political and economic
support; the donors who sought to promote internal
changes by strong leverage in fact failed to secure the
changes and, in the process, lost the capacity to
influence future Indian policy.
An atmosphere of partnership in policy dialogue took
considerable time to rebuild. In the past decade, major
donors (excluding, of course, the IMF) have shifted to
a sectoral framework for dialogue and now prefer the
World Bank to mediate. Active coordination by a
bilateral donor continues where the donor has special
expertise (the Scandinavians in health, the UK in
coal), but the general approach is multilateral.
The successful re-establishment of policy dialogue has
depended greatly on India's own skills. At both
sectoral and project levels, India fields a large range of
capable people with accumulated skills and experience.
The learning process is decidedly two-way. Moreover,
Indian officials are prominent at many levels of the
World Bank, so that Bank-coordinated dialogue
seems far removed from bilateral leverage with its
diplomatic and political overtones of an outside
imposition. India's planning and budgeting systems
are sophisticated, and tempered by long experience;
the country has clear and project-specific priorities.
Research results and capabilities are available from
outside the Indian Government. These circumstances
are absent for the vast majority of low-income
countries.
The Indian experience suggests that dialogue is most
effective where aid is in any case most effective, and
where the donor can persuade the recipient to go
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further along a path on which it already wants to go. A
more radical approach - challenging prevailing
vested interests or political convictions - can be
implemented only when the recipient's need for aid is
overwhelming. If aid constitutes more than 50 per cent
of public investment then macro-leverage is tempting,
if not often successful; if aid is 25 per cent or less of
public investment, donors can exert influence only if
they are realistic, and sectorally selective.
Recipient Experience of Dialogue: some
Cases in sub-Saharan Africa
(j) Tanzania
The most pronounced failure of dialogue in Africa has
probably been in Tanzania. Recent policy shifts (for
example, over the exchange rate and agricultural
pricing) have still to result in successful negotiation of
conditional Fund and Bank programmes, despite the
fact that few countries are in a worse economic
condition than Tanzania. Indeed, several observers
concur that Tanzanian negotiations with the Bank and
the Fund 'have not simply failed to reach agreements
that hold up, but have arguably had consequences for
domestic policy debate which have delayed the pace of
adjustment which would otherwise have taken place'
[Green 1986115.
Responsibility for this debacle of dialogue is shared
among external circumstances, Tanzanian domestic
mismanagement, and donor (plus IMF) failures and
misperceptions; but the assignment of proportions is
in the eye of the beholder. It is now difficult even to
quantify Tanzanian performance, since local economic
data-gathering has itself fallen victim to the traumas of
1978 onwards.
Since 1975 agreement has been reached with the IMF
only once (in 1980), on an EFF which broke down
after the first drawing. Until 1984, relations with the
World Bank steadily deteriorated: there has been no
SAL, although there has been programme lending for
rehabilitation of export sectors. While in 1978 aid
inflows effectively offset the current account deficit,
the deficit subsequently widened at an alarming rate
and the increase in aid flows slowed down. Even
observers sympathetic to the Tanzanian position agree
that short-run economic policy from 1977 to 1979 was
'fiscally reckless' [Green 1986:31], but later attempts
to redress the position have floundered in a mire of
seemingly unresolvable disputes.
The experience reinforces the Indian lesson: where
leverage is not 'leaning on an open door', and where
° The second tranche of the first SAL was delayed - apparently
because Malawi was in difficulty with the ¡MF over domestic credit
ceilings; see the Malawi Case Study for the Aid-Effectiveness Study,
by Adrtan Hewitt and Jonathan Kydd (plOt). Similar views are
expressed by van Arkadie (1983) and Payer (1982).
resources are not adequate for the task, it will fail even
in the severest economic circumstances. Fund and
Bank policy advice was perceived as an external
imposition, sometimes as an ideological challenge to
the Tanzanian Government's chosen path, and was
generally debated in a context of fierce battles over
individual instruments (for example, the exchange
rate) - usually out of all proportion to the role of the
instrument in a wider policy package. This phase may
now be drawing to a close, as a result of changes in
attitudes on all sides in response to Tanzania's
increasingly desperate plight; it leaves an unfortunate
example of how not to conduct policy dialogue,
whether as donor or recipient. The Tanzanian case is
well-known, in part, because the Tanzanian Govern-
ment has been unusually willing to make public its
disagreements with the international financial
institutions. Whereas, in other cases, agreement has
been followed by failure to deliver, the Tanzanian case
is distinguished by determined adherence on both
sides to relatively fixed and explicit positions so that
agreements have not been reached.
No other sub-Saharan examples (except, possibly,
Nigeria 1983-85) exhibit this degree of explicit
disagreement, but almost all demonstrate signs of the
lack of experience of both sides in dialogue over
macro-economic and broad development policy
questions; limited recipient capacity for negotiation
and policy analysis; and over-optimism about the
extent of policy reform that can be achieved even in the
most pressing circumstances. Above all, there is an air
of unreality about the potential efficacy of incentive
reforms in conditions where net foreign resource
inflows are continuing to decline (they are negative for
the more heavily indebted countries), and where the
technological or institutional support for reforms is
inevitably slow to develop. On the other hand, reform
programmes are now taking hold in countries with
long records of below-average performance: Tanzania
has already been mentioned; Ghana, Zambia,
Uganda, Mali and Guinea have set in train major
restructuring efforts. The task now is to sustain these
efforts with increased resources (and also the efforts of
those countries historically more favoured by the West
as 'successes': Kenya, Ivory Coast, Malawi), while
incorporating the lessons of initial experience with
macro-policy dialogue and reform.
(ii) Malawi
Malawi has received two Bank SALs to date, and is
one of the very few low-income countries with a
current Fund EFF. For some years Malawi has
enjoyed 'most favoured nation' status with the
international financial institutions as a result of its
growth record in the 1970s, and its apparent
willingness to rely more on the market and private
initiative than upon state intervention. In 1979,
Malawi's external position deteriorated rapidly; a
Bank SAL was put together during 1980 in some haste,
involving limited conditionality, but with a wide range
of studies with a five-year adjustment programme in
view. There seems to have been a deliberate element of
'learning by doing'; in 1979 the Bank's country reviews
of Malawi were still geared to support of project
decisions; by 1983, when the second SAL was
negotiated, the Bank felt confident enough to press a
stronger dose of policy reform (the country's external
position had further deteriorated in the meantime).
The Bank diagnosed six main structural difficulties in
Malawi: the slow growth of exports from peasant
agriculture; the narrow export base (dominated by
tobacco); energy shortage, especially a declining
fuelwood stock (also used for flue-cured tobacco);
deterioration in the financial performance of
parastatals; widening budget deficits, caused prin-
cipally by rapid expenditure growth; rigidity in
government price and wage control administration.
Both SALs have been disbursed with few inter-
ruptions'5 but the extent of policy reform achieved
appears to have fallen short of the World Bank's
wishes, and the record has exposed the points of stress
and misinterpretation in the original diagnosis. The
most progress has been made on improving the
financial performance of parastatals, and of the large
private corporation, Press Holdings, which effectively
functions as a somewhat personalised parastatal.
Progress in the other areas has been slowed down
either because the structural problem was initially mis-
specified (the reversion of peasant producers to
subsistence cultivation was as much a function of land
scarcity as of price distortions - though the latter
were important), or because government played no
role in the market concerned (fuelwood pricing), or
resisted the Bank's approach (social service user
charges, price control) and concentrated on resistance
rather than compromises. These shortfalls from
expectations, however, are best regarded as part of the
essential learning process, rather than failures of
policy dialogue.
(iii) Mali
Bank and Fund programmes in Mali have involved
more radical departures. Mali has no SAL, but other
forms of Bank support; it reached its first IMF
agreement in May 1982. Mali (following Guinea) had
been one of the few former French territories to adopt
an explicitly socialist path. Mali was seriously affected
by Sahelian drought; it also accumulated over the
years a vastly overgrown public sector (particularly in
the civil service itself - the government guaranteed
employment to secondary and higher education
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graduates), severe domestic price distortions,
controlled grain marketing, and an unstable exchange
rate.
Since 1980, Mali has responded to large increases in
non-project aid flows by adopting a five year
programme of reform. In February 1983, the
automatic recruitment of graduates to the public
service was abandoned, strict limits were placed on
new hiring, and redundancy schemes were introduced
to encourage civil servants to move into private
business. There were accompanying reforms in salary
determination and administration. From 1976, grain
prices were progressively increased, and more recently
grain marketing has been substantially decontrolled.
A Fund programme has supported debt rescheduling;
it includes reforms in tax administration (evasion was
running at high rates) and monetary and credit policy,
including credit allocation to rural business, and the
adoption of an apparently explicit target of the
abolition of exchange controls on current transactions
by 1985.
The sustainability of these reforms in the exceedingly
difficult conditions of a Sahelian country is clearly
open to doubt. Nevertheless, this is a clear case where,
after a long period of deterioration, policy dialogue
associated with aid has helped to bring about wide-
ranging reforms. Mali is apparently somewhat better
placed to withstand environmental difficulties than
some of its non-Sahelian neighbours.'6
(iv) Zambia
The experience of Zambia is roughly intermediate
between those of Malawi and Mali. Zambia has had a
series of IMF programmes since 1978, and, instead of
a SAL, the World Bank has lent large sums for
rehabilitation of the mining sector - which still
accounts for 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.
Zambia's structural problems of excessive dependence
on a single export, protected and import-intensive
industry, slow agricultural growth, high relative wage
costs and an expensive public sector have since 1979
been compounded by drought, sharp falls in the
purchasing power of copper exports (for reasons of
both volume and price), and one of the largest debt
burdens in sub-Saharan Africa - much of it
contracted over 1978 to 1982 when expectations of a
copper price revival encouraged fiscal laxity.'7
Vigorous attempts at reform began in December 1982,
with formal decontrol of all but four regulated
'6G. Bourgoignie, L'aide dans un contexte sahelien: le Mali', case
study prepared for the Aid-Effectiveness Study. By December 1984,
a famine threat had arisen again.
"Such expectations were supported by World Bank copper price
projections and by those of the minority private shareholders in the
Zambian mines.
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consumer prices, followed by frequent devaluations of
the local currency (and, in October 1985, a foreign
exchange auction to determine the rate), prompt
increases (in real terms) in agricultural producer
prices, foreign exchange retention schemes for 'non-
traditional' exporters, and reductions in the budget
deficit. The government has so far succeeded in
avoiding compensatory-wage increases, despite strong
urban unions and an accelerating rate of inflation. The
constraints on the success of the programme are two-
fold. First, the foreign exchange shortage continues to
be so acute that most industries function at 30 per cent
capacity or less - incentive changes alone cannot alter
this position; debt-service payments exceed annual
export earnings, and accumulated arrears amount to
more than two-thirds of export earnings - debt
rescheduling is thus a chronic preoccupation. Second,
it has proved far simpler to adjust prices (including the
exchange rate) than to overhaul agricultural marketing,
introduce user charges for public services, reduce
employment in the public sector, or improve
agricultural research and extension. In a sense, the
(successful) external pressure for price changes has
deflected attention from the need to reform
institutions or take difficult decisions on employment.
Without these reforms, and some easing of the
projected net capital outflows, the effects of the price
changes may well be dissipated - reducing confidence
in external advice and support in future.
These cases all indicate that dialogue- and leverage-
induced reform is possible in sub-Saharan African
conditions. But the experiment is still in its very early
stages, and its success is still highly vulnerable. In
order to sustain the momentum three things are
necessary: additional net foreign inflows; steady
improvement in domestic capacities to design and
negotiate reform programmes; and some reduction in
expectations that incentive reforms alone will produce
a 'quick fix'. Now that so many African governments
have shown willingness to de-politicise exchange rate
management, raise producer prices, and decontrol
consumer prices, it is perhaps time to shift the
emphasis to the support of institutional changes and
other policies that can make price changes effective.
Policy Dialogue: the Lessons so far
Policy dialogue is more successful where aid is in any
case more productive. In the cases of India and South
Korea, the policy dialogue has matured over long
periods during which the returns to aid-supported
investments have evidently been high. But even in
these cases the relationships had their critical points,
and on occasions the dialogue virtually ceased.
Dialogue over macro-conditionality is usually the
most difficult, and seems not to be sustainable when
there is regular or prolonged use of leverage. A stable
framework for dialogue in the long term is suggested
by the relationship of mutual respect which has
emerged over sectoral policies in India [see Toye's
article in this Bulletin].
Yet that requires country experience, appropriate
forms of aid, and confidence in the government's
conduct of macroeconomic policy or development
strategy. In sub-Saharan Africa, reliance upon project
aid had brought donors and recipients to an impasse
by the late 1970s: projects provided no framework for
policy dialogue, yet were low-yielding (or complete
failures) often because of broad failures in the policy
and institutional environment. Once non-project aid
forms were adopted by donors - in themselves, more
suited to sub-Saharan countries' contemporary needs
for input support, maintenance and rehabilitation -
the way was open for the use of dialogue and leverage
to engender broad macroeconomic policy changes.
African countries recent willingness to implement
major reforms is doubtless in large part a product of
appalling economic and social deterioration; but the
design of the reforms, and the path to implementation,
is predominantly the outcome of policy dialogue,
conditionality and support from non-project aid
flows. The shift in the composition of aid has thus
made for more effective aid, and explicit policy
dialogue about macroeconomic and strategic questions
has developed in tandem. If this phase is successful it
will be impermanent: the long-run aim should be to
shift the composition of aid, and the focus of dialogue,
back to the sectoral and project allocation of public
investment once economic recovery is in train, though
probably still with a greater emphasis on non-project
aid forms than was common in the 1960s and 1970s.
Donors' ability to exert leverage may be greatest in
extremis, but so are the risks oftheir failure to deliver.
In this respect, the experience of India in the mid-
1960s is salutary for donor involvement in sub-
Saharan Africa today. Reform programmes, whether
willingly adopted or conceded under severe pressure,
must be supported with adequate, suitable aid.
Otherwise they may not have time to take effect before
the regimes which adopted them are ejected from
power, or disillusionment with donor failures sets in.
In the short run, the degree of leverage is crudely
related to the volume of aid on offer; in the long run,
the credibility of policy dialogue in general depends on
donors' ability to make and sustain long-term aid
commitments.
There is no guarantee that the priority currently given
to economic reform in many sub-Saharan countries
can be sustained. Past policies of discrimination
against agriculture, excessive protection of import-
substituting industry and subsidisation of urban
consumption may have been economically irrational
but they have been entrenched by a strong political
logic. Governments' political support often consisted
of influential urban groups which stood to bear much
of the short-run cost of structural adjustment. Reform
has now become possible because economic conditions
have in any case forced powerful groups to accept
reductions in consumption and the rationalisation of
public spending, and leaderships have become aware
of the costs of postponing reform. Sustaining these
changes requires sufficient time (and thus external
resources) to allow some of the benefits of adjustment
to be realised and distributed, and to permit the
groups which stand to gain substantially from reform
(eg smallholders producing mainly for the market, or
citizen businessmen) to consolidate their influence
upon decision-making. It also requires institutional
changes to ensure that economic considerations
remain high on any regime's agenda.
Recipient Capacities
Beyond the confines of emergencies, effective dialogue
or conditional programmes also require negotiating
strength and analytical capacity on the recipient side;
without these, the risk that reform programmes will be
seen as outside impositions, and will lapse when aid
flows cease, will remain high. The task of improving
negotiating skills overlaps to a considerable extent
with that of strengthening the decision-making
capacities and economic policy-making institutions of
LDCs - a task which the World Bank already stresses
in SAL operations - but it is not identical. There is
scope for improvement of the technical assistance
facilities available to LDC governments for support in
the process of negotiating external finance of all kinds.
There is an approximate analogy with the improve-
ment, over the late 1960s and 1970s, of LDC
governments' capacity to negotiate deals with foreign
private companies - particularly in minerals
industries. This improvement was aided by the
establishment of independent international centres of
advice, research and technical assistance to govern-
ments - not only for investment appraisals, or
specific technical reports, but also for regular and
long-term assistance in clarifying objectives, drawing
up negotiating positions, and the conduct of
negotiations.
In the field of assistance for negotiations on debt
rescheduling, and on adjustment programmes, there is
at present a vacuum - partly filled at times by costly
private finance advice from merchant banks. Selected
multilateral agencies, independent of the main
lenders, should be supported in modest efforts to
expand the provision of advisory services for
adjustment programme negotiations.
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Increasing emphasis on policy dialogue is likely to
bring changes in technical assistance practices, but
there are dangers in tying technical assistance too
closely to conditionality. Some donors (eg the World
Bank) now show signs of wishing to link technical
assistance more explicitly to the implementation of
policy reforms agreed in SAL-type programmes:
technical assistance in support of reform programmes,
with flexibility for experts to respond to changing
circumstances is clearly desirable but assignment of
new personnel to carry out a negotiated programme,
with the threat of their withdrawal if the government
deviates, is less evidently useful. Moreover, such
initiatives may over-estimate the strength of a donor's
leverage, and fail to recognise that any negotiated
programme is a compromise.
In sub-Saharan Africa the present phase of dialogue
involves a heavy concentration on the recipients' own
macro-policies. The traffic predominantly flows one
way. The Indian case suggests that dialogue becomes
fully constructive and durable when there is a genuine
two-way exchange. This requires recognition of past
donor errors, and discussion of them in the course of
dialogue. It is clear that, in Africa, many donors have a
long record of preference for large infrastructural
projects, capital-intensive production plant, complex
administrative structures and so on - the very things
for which African development patterns have recently
come under heavy criticism. These errors are
recognised in general terms (eg in World Bank reports
on sub-Saharan Africa); it would be of greater value if
the lessons of individual experiences were to be
examined in country-level discussions. There is also
scope for inclusion of discussion about rich country
policies which affect the performance of LDCs: trade
policy and the rise of protectionism, interest rates, aid
policy itself.'8
Donor coordination for policy dialogue - in seeking
to avoid conflicting or confused policy advice - may
risc the appearance of 'ganging up' on the individual
recipient, forcing it to adopt a defensive and perhaps
hostile stance. The solution probably lies in the
sensitive use of consultative group arrangements, with
coordination by both the recipient and a multilateral
agency, and with a strong analytical input from the
recipient.
Finally, the context of dialogue about recipient
policies should include explicit appraisal of the terms
of trade outlook, and of prospects for debt-
rescheduling, or for new capital inflows. The donor
involved in dialogue, and afortiori in the imposition of
conditions, should be prepared to make clear and
° As in bilateral discussions between Papua New Guinea and
Australia, see the case review of Papua New Guinea (by Philip
Daniel) in the literature survey.
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monitorable commitments about the aid flows that
will be forthcoming if reforms are made. Moreover, an
apparent donor interest in 'good domestic policy' that
is in fact tempered by the commercial interest of
suppliers in the donor country will breed disillusion-
ment, and may cause serious damage.'9
Policy dialogue is now an integral part of international
aid relations. Macro-conditionality, too, is the
necessary counterpart of the volume of non-project
aid that is needed in low income countries. The record
suggests that improvements in aid-effectiveness have
already been achieved by these means. The tasks now
are to appreciate that relationships in policy dialogue
must evolve if they are to endure, that the successful
exercise of leverage over macro-policies is possible
only in exceptional circumstances, and that the
prerequisite for consolidation of the gains already
made and for the future success of dialogue is the
strengthening of recipient capacities to make it a
genuine two-way process.
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